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I.

INTRODUCTION

Have you ever had that strange sensation that you are being
watched? You casually glance around to see if anyone is staring at
you. You do not see anything unusual, but you cannot shake the
feeling. You can feel someone’s eyes on you as the goosebumps
begin to spread, but you just cannot locate the source. Is it simply
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paranoia on your part or is this a side effect of living in a time
where there are cameras everywhere you look? Cameras are on
streetlights at intersections, in nearly every store and many homes,
and on every police squad car. Cameras are also in the pockets of
almost every single person that you see. What is the one place that
has not been taken over by prying eyes? Not too long ago, one
might have said the sky; however, it is likely that is no longer the
case.
The drones that have been used so frequently in foreign wars
are beginning to turn their gazes upon the United States. Drones
are an exciting new tool for police officers and a terrifying new
threat in the eyes of civil libertarians. Police drones have the
potential to save thousands of lives—they also have the potential to
keep an entire nation under constant surveillance and
systematically remove any semblance of privacy.
A passage from George Orwell’s nightmarish vision of life in a
surveillance-state society, written long before drone technology
surfaced, eerily resembles the issue that this article attempts to
discuss:
The black-mustachio’d face gazed down from every
commanding corner. There was one on the house front
immediately opposite. Big Brother Is Watching You, the
caption said . . . In the far distance a helicopter skimmed
down between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a
bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving flight. It
1
was the Police Patrol, snooping into people’s windows.
How can society deal with such powerful new technology? This
article seeks to answer that question by examining Supreme Court
2
3
cases, the constitutionality of police drone use in Minnesota, and
4
current legislation put forward by other states. This article
1. Compare GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Penguin Books 1961), with Matthew R.
Koerner, Drones and the Fourth Amendment: Redefining Expectations of Privacy, 64 DUKE
L.J. 1129, 1130 (2015) (“Senator Dianne Feinstein, a staunch advocate of
governmental surveillance and Chairman of the 113th Congress’ Senate
Intelligence Committee, recently found herself, rather ironically, as the target of
surveillance. One day at her home, Senator Feinstein walked to the window to
check on a protest that was taking place outside. Much to her surprise, a small
drone hovered on the other side of the window, only inches away, spying on her.
The drone immediately flew away.”).
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See infra Part V.
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concludes by making a recommendation for an ideal statute
5
controlling police drone use. The article begins by giving a general
6
background of drones and drone technology.
II. BACKGROUND
Drone technology, already quite complex, is advancing at a
rapid pace, with which the Supreme Court, Congress, and state
legislators are struggling to keep up. The term “drone” is used to
describe an unmanned aircraft system (UAS), but machines differ
7
immensely from model to model. Some are as small as a bug, while
8
others are as big as commercial airliners. There are drones that
can remain in the sky for days, and there are drones whose
9
batteries last less than thirty minutes. The functionality and
10
features of drones are limited only by one’s imagination. Drones
can be equipped with high-powered cameras, facial recognition
technology, microphones, programs that recognize suspicious
11
behavior, and weapons both lethal and non-lethal.
There are those who regard this issue as a problem for future
generations or something that is only prevalent in science fiction
12
movies. These individuals would likely be quite surprised to learn
5. See infra Part VI.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See Keric D. Clanahan, Drone-Sourcing? United States Air Force Unmanned
Aircraft Systems, Inherently Governmental Functions, and the Role of Contractors, 22 FED.
CIR. B.J. 135, 138 n.10 (2012) (providing an overview of the different terms used to
describe UAS or drones).
8. RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN
DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 2 (2013); see also Koerner, supra note 1, at 1150 (“Current
models range in size from a wingspan of just three centimeters to over forty
meters.”).
9. THOMPSON II, supra note 8, at 15–16.
10. See generally Joshua D. Beard, Up in the Air: The Legal Status of Drones, 94
MICH. B.J. 20, 20–21 (2015) (noting areas in which drones possess potential use
including advertisement, media coverage, package transportation, agriculture,
photography, and mapping).
11. See William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”:
Regulating the Next Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1139,
1165–78 (2013) (discussing current drone technologies and where they might
expand going forward).
12. Joshua Foust, The Science Fiction of Drone-Phobia, BEACON (Oct. 14, 2013,
4:46 PM), https://www.beaconreader.com/joshua-foust/the-science-fiction-of
-drone-phobia.
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of the quickly developing arsenal of drones purchased and
possessed by federal agencies across the nation. For example, the
FBI has spent over three million dollars assembling a fleet of
13
drones that has been used in operations since 2006. These
operations have involved storming barricaded buildings, tracking
14
criminal suspects, and examining crime scenes. Another agency
heavily invested in the use of drone technology is the U.S. Border
15
Patrol. The operating cost alone for the border patrol’s drones is
16
approximately $12,255 per hour. Interestingly, police have also
uncovered instances of drug smugglers using drones to transport
17
drugs across the border from Mexico.
Federal agencies have not been selfish with their drones
either. They have been more than happy to lend their drones to
18
local police departments when they are needed. The Department
of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection conducted
19
687 drone missions for other agencies from 2010 to 2012.
Additionally, several police departments have sought to add drones
to their own arsenals. Drones have been used for various domestic
20
21
operations by police departments in North Dakota, Texas, and
13. Brian Bennett, FBI Has Been Using Drones Since 2006, Watchdog Agency Says,
L.A. TIMES (Sep. 26, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow
/la-na-nn-fbi-using-drones-2006-20130926-story.html#axzz2xlB06oDp.
14. Id.
15. See Brian Bennett, Border Drones Are Ineffective, Badly Managed, Too
Expensive, Official Says, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com
/nation/immigration/la-na-border-drones-20150107-story.html.
16. Id.
17. Kristina Davis, Two Plead Guilty in Border Drug Smuggling by Drone, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015, 9:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me
-drone-drugs-20150813-story.html.
18. Sandra Fulton, Police Hunger for Drones May be Growing, but So Are Privacy
Concerns, ACLU (Jan. 16, 2014, 3:06 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/police
-hunger-drones-may-be-growing-so-are-privacy-concerns (“In 2010, for example,
DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducted 76 drone missions for
other agencies. The next year, that number quadrupled, and it remained at nearly
the same level in 2012.”).
19. Id.
20. See Jason Koebler, Court Upholds Domestic Drone Use in Arrest of American
Citizen, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news
/articles/2012/08/02/court-upholds-domestic-drone-use-in-arrest-of-american
-citizen.
21. See Peter Finn, Domestic Use of Aerial Drones by Law Enforcement Likely to
Prompt Privacy Debate, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2011, 12:56 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/22
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22

Wisconsin. In addition, a total of eighty-one police departments,
23
universities, and various other state and federal departments have
applied for drone operational licenses from the Federal Aviation
24
Administration (FAA).
The use of drones by law enforcement agencies is slowly
25
increasing. However, a rapid surge in drone use has occurred in
26
the private sphere. Small, privately owned drones are becoming
27
more affordable and more visible in day-to-day life. The
proliferation of drones has been so rapid that the FAA estimates
that there will be approximately 30,000 drones in the air within ten
28
years. In preparing for a future where drones will likely take up a
sizable amount of the national airspace, the FAA recently released a
set of guidelines that dictate the proper and improper ways to use
personal drones, as well as a licensing system for those who wish to
29
fly drones. Given the rising popularity of personal drone use, it is
/AR2011012204111.html.
22. See Anne Jungen, West Salem Police Start Using Drone; New Technology Made
Debut in August, WASH. TIMES (Sep. 21, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com
/news/2015/sep/21/west-salem-police-using-drone/?page=all.
23. See Perry Chiaramonte, Growing Number of Universities Want to Fly Drones
over Campus, Report Shows, FOX NEWS (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com
/tech/2013/02/28/high-flying-drones-over-halls-higher-ed.html (“The Georgia
Institute of Technology’s police department applied for a permit to use two small
helicopter drones during special events, as well as day-to-day operations, to
respond to areas before a police officer would quickly place eyes on the target or
crisis area.” (internal quotations omitted)).
24. See Shawn Musgrave, Finally, Here’s Every Organization Allowed to Fly Drones
in the US, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 6, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com
/read/every-organization-flying-drones-in-the-us.
25. See Michael L. Smith, Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Drones: The Need
for State Legislation, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 424 (2015).
26. See Welcome to the Drone Age, ECONOMIST (Sept. 26, 2015), http://
www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21666118-miniature-pilotless
-aircraft-are-verge-becoming-commonplace-welcome.
27. See id.
28. Robert Johnson, FAA: Look for 30,000 Drones to Fill American Skies by the End
of the Decade, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 8, 2012, 2:12 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com
/robert-johnson-bi-30000-drones-by-2020-2012-2.
29. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FAA ORDER NO. 8000.372A, UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) DESIGNATED AIRWORTHINESS REPRESENTATIVES (DAR) FOR
UAS CERTIFICATION AT UAS TEST (2014); see also Brian Stern & Matthias Rubekeil,
Coming Home to Roost—Domestic Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 62 R.I. BUS. J. 5, 9
(2013) (“The deadline for this plan as mandated by Congress is September 2015
and likely to create a lot of movement in the market for drone use by private
companies, perhaps resulting in changes to society and business similar to those of
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very likely that the application of these guidelines will have an
30
impact on how society views drone use by the police.
The drones that law enforcement agencies have access to today
31
are fairly basic in their functionality. For example, the Los
32
Angeles Police Department possesses two Draganflyer X6 drones.
These drones are capable of providing high definition live video of
whatever its cameras capture; however, they are only able to fly for
33
twenty to twenty-five minutes before the battery must be changed.
This technology limits the privacy concerns of drones, but better
34
technology is not far off.
The U.S. military has developed drone technology that, if used
in domestic law enforcement operations, could pose massive
constitutional privacy concerns. The most extreme example of this
35
type of technology is called the “Gorgon Stare.” The Gorgon Stare
is a large drone equipped with a wide-angle lens capable of
36
recording visual information. In practice, this means that this
drone can hover high in the sky and, using its wide-angle lens,
37
record the visual information of an entire city in real-time. If
the mass proliferation of affordable cellular tele-phony in the early 21st century.”).
30. Tyler Hite, Domestic Presence in the Skies: Why Americans Should Care About
Private Drone Regulation, 31 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 184, 213–15 (2015).
31. See, e.g., Questions Many People Ask of Us, DRAGANFLY INNOVATIONS INC.
[hereinafter DRAGANFLY], http://www.draganfly.com/questions-answers (last
visited Feb. 11, 2016) (discussing functions of a particular drone, such as its ability
to provide real-time camera viewing, a height limit of 400 to 500 feet, and the basic
components damaged during a crash).
32. See Melissa Pamer & Mark Mester, LAPD’s 2 Drones Will Remain Grounded
During Policy Review, Police Commission Says Amid Protests, KTLA 5 NEWS (Sep. 15,
2014, 8:28 AM), http://ktla.com/2014/09/15/anti-spying-group-drone-free-lapd
-to-protest-state-bill-that-would-allow-police-drones; Jim Newton, Drones and the
LAPD, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe
-newton-column-lapd-drones-20141117-column.html.
33. See, e.g., DRAGANFLY, supra note 31.
34. See Marra & McNeil, supra note 11, at 1174 (“Tomorrow’s drones will
exhibit greater autonomy along all four stages of the OODA Loop [Observe,
Orient, Decide, Act]. They will require less human interaction, navigate greater
levels of environmental uncertainty, and enjoy higher levels of mission
assertiveness.”).
35. See Ellen Nakashima & Craig Whitlock, With Air Force’s Gorgon Drone ‘We
Can See Everything’, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2011, 12:09 AM), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/01
/AR2011010102690 _pf.html.
36. Id.
37. Id.

9. Paquette_FF4 (1296-1330) (Do Not Delete)

1302

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

6/24/2016 11:27 AM

[Vol. 42:1296

anything were to happen in that particular city, it would be
recorded and could be viewed later by military personnel who
38
might even be able to see who committed the act in question.
Currently the Gorgon Stare technology is fully within the
purview of the military, however the application of this technology
to domestic police use could be very useful to law enforcement
agencies. For example, say the Boston Police Department obtained
a drone with Gorgon Stare technology. The drone could observe
the entire city, and when the bombs went off at the Boston
Marathon in 2013, the recorded images could have been analyzed
to see who the bombers were and where they went after the
bombing. This technology could have located the bombers in a
very short amount of time. However, the drone would also record
the movements of every citizen of Boston, drastically impacting
their privacy rights.
With the scope of future drone technology in mind, it is easy
to see why citizens are wary of law enforcement agencies possessing
drones, even if they are a far cry from the Gorgon Stare
39
technology. Citizens have voiced their concern over the police use
40
of drones through protests.
In August 2015, North Dakota passed House Bill 1328, which
41
made it legal for police to equip drones with non-lethal weapons.
This recent development in drone legislation has been met with
38. Id.
39. See Fulton, supra note 18; Nadia Prupis, Activists Sound Alarm as More Police
Departments Consider Using Drones, MINT PRESS NEWS (Aug. 27, 2014), http://
www.mintpressnews.com/activists-sound-alarm-police-departments-consider-using
-drones/195916; Christian M. Wade, Battle Brewing over Police Drones in Mass.,
NEWBURY PORT NEWS (Mar. 28, 2015, 3:20 AM), http://www.newburyportnews.com
/news/local_news/battle-brewing-over-police-drones-in-mass/article_5846a6a5
-31b7-5636-abc6-c52344e0de90.html.
40. See Joseph Serna, Anti-Spying Coalition Launches Campaign Against LAPD
Drones, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local
/lanow/la-me-ln-anti-drone-campaign-lapd-city-hall-20140821-story.html; Gordon
Tokumatsu & Jeanne Kuang, City Hall Protesters Demand “Drone-Free LAPD”, NBC
(Aug. 21, 2014, 2:03 PM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/City-Hall
-Protesters-Demand-Drone-Free-LAPD-272202761.html (describing the concern
that certain segments of society have when it comes to trusting police officers and
the discretion that they possess in enforcing the law).
41. See Eyragon Eidam, Reports on North Dakota Weaponized Drone Law Miss
Larger Picture, GOV’T TECH. (Sep. 18, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/public
-safety/Reports-on-North-Dakota-Weaponized-Drone-Law-Miss-Larger-Picture
.html.
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extreme distrust and disappointment. Even police departments in
North Dakota are skeptical about the power that they have been
granted. A Lieutenant of the Fargo Police Department, Michael
Mitchell, said that he is “perplexed, because we do not see many
43
reasons why we would use such technology.”
Regardless of how one views drones, the facts show drone use
is on the rise. Every year society will see more and more drones,
and every year society will encounter new problems, as well as new
uses for drones. The question that needs to be asked: How can
society balance the positive, useful aspects of drones with the
negative, privacy issues of drones? Is this something that the
Constitution and its interpretive case law are prepared to handle? Is
it necessary to enact federal or state legislation in order to manage
this new technology? Finally, what kind of legislation is the most
appropriate to strike the perfect balance between privacy concerns
and police utility?
III. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND DOMESTIC DRONE USE
Domestic drone use by law enforcement agencies is a relatively
new phenomenon. There is no case law expressly ruling on the
constitutionality of law enforcement’s use of drones. At the same
time, law enforcement agencies have been pushing the limits of the
44
Fourth Amendment for centuries. Thus, there is existing case law

42. See Jennifer Cook, Letter: Weaponized ND Drones Terrible Idea, IN FORUM
(Sep. 20, 2015, 12:34 AM), http://www.inforum.com/letters/3842432-letter
-weaponized-nd-drones-terrible-idea; Mark Karlin, Look Out: Drones That Shoot
Tasers Now Legal for Police Use in First State, BUZZFLASH (Sep. 11, 2015, 5:17 AM),
http://www.truth-out.org/buzzflash/commentary/drones-that-shoot-tasers-now
-legal-for-police-use-in-north-dakota/19524-drones-that-shoot-tasers-now-legal-for
-police-use-in-north-dakota.
43. Noel Brinkerhoff, Fargo Police Dept. Shuns Weaponized Drones Approved for
Police by North Dakota, ALLGOV (Sep. 5, 2015), http://www.allgov.com/news
/controversies/fargo-police-dept-shuns-weaponized-drones-approved-for-police-by
-north-dakota-150905?news=857351. But see Matt Alderton, To the Rescue! Why
Drones in Police Work are the Future of Crime Fighting, LINE/SHAPE/SPACE (April 30,
2015, 5:44 PM), http://lineshapespace.com/drones-in-police-work-future-crime
-fighting (“It’s like having 20 officers on patrol or more . . . .”).
44. See generally Gerald G. Ashdown, Drugs, Ideology, and the
Deconstitutionalization of Criminal Procedure, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1992); Thomas Y.
Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of
Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933
(2010); William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a

9. Paquette_FF4 (1296-1330) (Do Not Delete)

1304

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

6/24/2016 11:27 AM

[Vol. 42:1296

that can be tentatively applied to scenarios involving domestic
45
drone use for surveillance purposes. The Constitution itself is the
ideal starting place for this analysis.
A.

The Constitution

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
46
be violated . . . .” This clause has guided police conduct and been
47
the subject of significant case law. This case law has been used to
interpret what constitutes a search and what constitutes an
48
unreasonable search and seizure. As of the writing of this article,
the Supreme Court has not heard, nor is scheduled to hear, any
cases involving police use of a drone in a way that allegedly violated
the Fourth Amendment. The particular features that drones can
offer make them potentially excellent surveillance tools, and it is
likely only a matter of time before the Supreme Court is called
49
upon to weigh in on the issue.

Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799 (2000); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the
Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994).
45. See Jennifer O’Brien, Warrantless Government Drone Surveillance: A Challenge
to the Fourth Amendment, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 155, 181–88
(2013).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886) (“It is our
opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man’s private papers to
establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the
scope of the fourth amendment to the constitution, in all cases in which a search
and seizure would be, because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole
object and purpose of search and seizure.”). See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE § 1.1(a) (5th ed. 2015) (providing a history of the origins of the
Fourth Amendment); Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court
Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895 (2002).
48. Koerner, supra note 1, at 1130 (“The Fourth Amendment is the ‘chief
source of privacy protection’ in the American justice system. It is intended to
empower the government to investigate and enforce laws to a ‘reasonably
satisfactory level,’ while still restricting these powers.” (quoting RONALD J. ALLEN,
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 337 (2011))).
49. See Michael J. Sheehan, Note, U.S. Citizens’ Fourth Amendment Rights &
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: An Appeal for Bright-Line Legislative Action, 32 TEMP. J. SCI.
TECH. & ENVTL. L. 255, 279 (2013) (“Many types of UAVs, especially those
employing helicopter-style rotors with hover and stare capabilities will provide a
major challenge to the precedent set by the Supreme Court in the aerial
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Developing Fourth Amendment Case Law

The bedrock case in the development of Fourth Amendment
50
search and seizure jurisprudence is Katz v. United States. There,
Justice Harlan—in his frequently cited concurrence—laid out the
standard on how to analyze whether a search was reasonable within
51
the eyes of the Constitution. This analysis requires the fact finder
to determine whether the individual subjected to the alleged
search had a subjective expectation of privacy and whether society
is objectively prepared to deem that privacy expectation
52
reasonable. Based on this analysis, Justice Harlan stated that “a
man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the
‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to
53
keep them to himself has been exhibited.”
The Katz test eventually became known as the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test and has been applied in virtually every
54
Fourth Amendment aerial search case since. Two lines of
authority applying this test are particularly relevant to the
constitutionality of police drone use: police tracking of individuals
and police aerial surveillance.
1.

Police Tracking of Individuals

In United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court reviewed police
use of advanced technology geared toward tracking the location of
55
a suspect. Without obtaining a warrant, Minnesota police officers
placed a beeper equipped with a radio transmitter into a barrel of
56
chloroform that was later sold to the suspect. Police then used
surveillance cases, Ciraolo and Riley, because these UAVs are often designed for
flight below the operating levels of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.” (citations
omitted)).
50. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Koerner, supra
note 1, at 1143–45 (“The Court first announced the privacy-rights paradigm in
Katz v. United States.”).
51. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Koerner, supra note 1, at 1144–45 (describing the use of the
reasonable expectation of privacy test over the decades since Katz and the
application of the test to new areas of search and seizure jurisprudence).
55. 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
56. Id. at 277–78.
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that beeper to locate a cabin owned by the suspect. Following
three days of visual surveillance, the police obtained a search
58
warrant and discovered a drug laboratory inside the cabin.
The Supreme Court found that the use of the beeper was not a
search because “a person traveling . . . on public thoroughfares has
59
no [objective] reasonable expectation of privacy.” Thus,
[w]hen Petschen traveled over the public streets he
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the
fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made,
and the fact of his final destination when he exited from
60
public roads onto private property.
The majority believed that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the police from “augmenting” their senses with the use of
61
“science and technology.” The defendant’s constitutional claim
rested on the idea that the use of beepers in such a way could lead
to tracking a citizen’s location twenty-four hours a day for seven
62
days a week, without any judicial oversight. The majority declined
to confront this issue and focused solely on the fact pattern that was
63
presented in the record. Further, the majority rejected the idea
that the technology used was a search because it was making police
64
tracking more efficient. The Court focused on the idea that this
would not have constituted a search if the defendant had simply
been tailed by a police officer instead of tracked via radio
65
transmitter.
Knotts seemed to give police the green light on using advanced
technology in order to further investigative efficiency. This
naturally led to cases where police use of technology went too far.
United States v. Karo presented the Court with a nearly identical
66
fact pattern to that in Knotts. However, Karo contained one crucial
difference: the DEA continued to monitor the beeper after it had
57. Id. at 278.
58. Id. at 279.
59. Id. at 281.
60. Id. at 281–82.
61. Id. at 282.
62. Id. at 283.
63. Id. at 284.
64. Id. (“We have never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality,
and we decline to do so now.”).
65. Id. at 285.
66. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
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entered the subject house. In doing so, the DEA found that the
68
illegal material was being transported from house to house. The
Court found this constituted an illegal search because the beeper
was transmitting information from inside the homes in which it was
69
stored. This told agents that at a particular time, in a particular
70
place, and inside a particular home, there were illegal materials.
The Court also found if the technology had not been used and the
police officer personally wanted to confirm that there were illegal
materials inside the house, the officer would have had to walk into
71
the house and look around for the illegal materials. This behavior
would obviously constitute a search and, therefore, for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment, the use of the beeper was found to be an
72
unconstitutional, warrantless search.
In a 2012 case, United States v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court
heard another Fourth Amendment search case involving the police
73
tracking of an individual’s whereabouts. Justice Alito and Justice
Sotomayor each wrote a concurrence and discussed the difficulties
74
that could arise in future constitutional privacy cases.
Jones involved a GPS tracker that officers secretly planted on
75
the underside of Jones’ truck. The government then tracked the
GPS for the next twenty-eight days and collected over 2000 pages of
76
data. Jones argued that this was a violation of his reasonable
77
expectation of privacy.
The Court held that the warrantless police actions violated the
78
Fourth Amendment. Curiously, the majority decided it was
unnecessary to apply the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test,
based on its belief that the use of the GPS clearly violated the
79
common law trespass theory, citing a case from 1765. By 2012,
67. Id. at 708–10.
68. Id. at 708–09.
69. Id. at 715.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
74. See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see id. at 957 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
75. Id. at 948 (Scalia, J., majority).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 950.
78. Id. at 954.
79. Id. at 949 (citing Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P.));
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many scholars believed the trespass theory in constitutional search
and seizure analysis disappeared and was completely supplanted by
80
the Katz test. The majority added an element to the test used for
determining whether a search has occurred: if the government
physically trespasses on a citizen’s private property, then there is
automatically a search, but if the government does not physically
trespass, then the “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis
81
follows.
The majority’s clarification of the test used to determine
whether a search has occurred has proven useful in subsequent
82
cases. However, the real takeaway from this case is in the
concurring opinions of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito.
Justice Sotomayor laid out two major concerns with the use of
GPS technology: (1) the wealth and breadth of information that
83
can be collected; and (2) its relatively cheap cost. “GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
84
associations.” Justice Sotomayor explained that most of the trips
one takesusing public thoroughfaresare innocent enough;

see also Y. Douglas Yang, Big Brother’s Grown Wings: The Domestic Proliferation of Drone
Surveillance and the Law’s Response, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 343, 356–57 (2014)
(stating the holding in Jones “expanded Fourth Amendment protections, but also
obfuscated the Fourth Amendment standard that courts should apply”).
80. See, e.g., Shane Crotty, The Aerial Dragnet: A Drone-ing Need for Fourth
Amendment Change, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 219, 248–49 (2014) (stating the Jones opinion
“muddied the Fourth Amendment waters” and “convoluted the issue” of Fourth
Amendment privacy protection); Yang, supra note 79, at 357 (“As opposed to
clarifying the standard the government should follow in surveillance procedures,
the Jones majority’s revival of Olmstead’s physicality requirement created a split in
the Supreme Court about whether Katz’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test
applied exclusively in government surveillance cases, or whether Katz merely
supplemented an Olmstead-based physical invasion approach.”).
81. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–52.
82. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 823–25 (2d Cir. 2015) (using the
test laid out in Jones to analyze the NSA’s secret telephone metadata program);
United States v. Baez, 744 F.3d 30, 33–36 (1st Cir. 2014) (describing the difference
in search and seizure law before and after Jones); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d
58 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 204 (2013) (holding that a pre-Jones
warrantless search using a GPS tracker was exempt from suppression, despite its
unconstitutionality, based on the “good-faith” doctrine).
83. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
84. See id. at 955.
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however, there are several trips that are not. For example, trips to
places such as “the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion
clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal
defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the
mosque, synagogue or church, [or] the gay bar” provide
86
information that details the private lives of citizens. Justice
Sotomayor feared that through the use of GPS monitoring, this
information could conceivably be collected and stored in order to
87
gain insight into the ideas and beliefs of individual citizens. The
fear of being watched may chill civilian “associational and
88
expressive freedoms.”
Consequently, under current constitutional search and seizure
law, the government could arguably track a citizen for extended
periods of time and record the information collected in a database,
89
without ever obtaining a warrant. That being said, the same
argument can be made whether the government is using a GPS
tracker, a drone, or a team of police officers. In each case, the
90
biggest restraint on the government is practicability.

85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
87. Id. at 966; see also Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1934, 1956 (2013) (“That information gives the watcher increased power
over the watched that can be used to persuade, influence, or otherwise control
them, even if they do not know they are being watched or persuaded.”).
88. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (“The net result is that GPS monitoring—by
making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate
information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion,
chooses to track—may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in a
way that is inimical to democratic society.’” (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez,
640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring))).
89. See Jonathan Olivito, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: Limiting Drone
Surveillance Through the Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
669, 701 (2013) (“Drones can operate clandestinely over a broad area for
extended periods of time, making them ideal surveillance tools. Operators can
easily equip drones with high-resolution cameras, sensors, and video analysis
programs. With current electronic storage systems, any information collected by
drones—including photographs, videos, and sensory data—can be stored
indefinitely for subsequent aggregation, analysis, and distribution. Whether
government drone operators collect information intentionally or unwittingly, the
result is equally disquieting: substantial amounts of personal information could be
collected and stored through drone surveillance of public areas.” (citation
omitted)).
90. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Justice Sotomayor also points out that GPS technology is
comparably cheaper than other surveillance tactics, such as a
91
rotating team of agents trained in advanced surveillance. Because
GPS technology is cheaper, there is less of a constraint on the
92
government to use such tactics. If a certain technology allows
warrantless searches to occur in certain areas more frequently, then
that technology has expanded the scope of information that the
93
government can collect from its citizens. Justice Sotomayor
suggests that this expansion in scope might alter society’s
94
reasonable expectation of privacy in public places. For example,
one might not expect a trip to the grocery store to be private, but
one would most likely feel that their privacy was violated if the
government knew every single trip they took over a period of two
months.
Justice Alito, citing historical legal responses to advances in
technology, observed in some cases that the best way to deal with
developing technology that intrudes on privacy in new ways is to
95
enact legislation. New legislation was used to handle the
96
developing technology of wiretapping. Congress did not wish to
leave the complex issue of wiretapping to a slowly developing
97
system of common law. Therefore, it passed 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510
through 2522, which from that point on was the primary means
98
governing wiretapping cases. Justice Alito stated, “A legislative
body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a
99
comprehensive way.”

91. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.; see also Stern & Rubekeil, supra note 29, at 8 (“Under Kyllo, the
Fourth Amendment may protect the citizenry from warrantless searches for the
time being, due to the relatively low usage of drones and society’s expectation that
drones will not violate its privacy . . . . However, if the appearance of drones
hovering in the sky becomes commonplace rather than novelty, and subsequently
society becomes desensitized to seeing drones floating over the backyard or the
football field, then a search by drone might cease to interfere with the reasonable
expectation of privacy.”).
95. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 962–63.
97. Id. at 963.
98. Id.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2013).
99. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Jones also brought up a topic that had not been covered by
previous privacy law cases: whether there is a certain point in time
where warrantless tracking of a civilian can change from
100
constitutional to unconstitutional. That is, is there a length of
time where perfectly legal warrantless tracking crosses over the line
into a search which intrudes upon society’s reasonable expectation
101
of privacy? Again, the government tracked every single movement
102
of Jones’ vehicle for four weeks. Unfortunately, these questions
were discussed by Justice Alito, but not answered in any meaningful
103
way. These questions will arguably be raised in future cases of
police drone use, but as of now, the U.S. Supreme Court has no
clear answer.
2.

Police Aerial Surveillance

Drones are new to the world of law enforcement, but aerial
104
Police officers have used airplanes and
surveillance is not.
helicopters for surveillance as aircraft have become more popular
105
in modern society. The cases involving aircraft demonstrate the
idea that the prevalence of specific aircraft being used in society
has an influence over the extent that police are allowed to use
those aircraft for surveillance.
California v. Ciraolo was the Supreme Court’s first case in which
it had to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test to aerial
106
surveillance. In Ciraolo, police received an anonymous tip that an
107
individual was growing marijuana in his yard. Officers arrived at
the house but were unable to see anything due to a fence that
108
completely enclosed the yard. One perseverant police officer
109
chartered a private plane and flew over the suspect’s house. In

100. See id. (explaining the amount of time where tracking might become a
search).
101. See id.
102. Id. at 946 (Scalia, J., majority).
103. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
104. Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for
Legislators, BROOKINGS (Nov. 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2
/2014/11/drones-and-aerial-surveillance.
105. Id.
106. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986).
107. Id. at 209.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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this flyover, approximately 1000 feet in the air, the officer was able
to see marijuana plants in the yard and used this information to
110
obtain a search warrant.
The majority in Ciraolo suggests it was of crucial importance
that the officer was flying within public navigable airspace, as
111
defined by the FAA. This is important because it suggests any
individual flying in a commercial airliner or private airplane could
peer out of an airline window and see the world below, including
112
the marijuana plants at issue in Ciraolo. The majority opined that
if any member of the public could look out of a plane and see into
the yard, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in that
113
yard. Chief Justice Berger stated that “[i]n an age where private
and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is
unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants
were constitutionally protected from being observed with the
114
naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.” This assertion suggests
that, as private drone use becomes more popular, an individual’s
115
reasonable expectation of privacy might be reduced.
The dissent argued that the majority’s decision moved away
from the original intention of the Fourth Amendment—to ensure
citizens “dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
116
surveillance.” Justice Powell analyzed the case by considering the
actions law enforcement would have had to take in the absence of
117
technology. If the officer had not chartered a private plane to
peer into the yard, he would have had to climb the fence or use a
ladder to peer over it—which arguably would have been an

110. Id.
111. Id. at 213.
112. Id. at 213–14.
113. Id. at 214.
114. Id. at 215.
115. See Koerner, supra note 1, at 1154 (“The government often employs new
instruments to investigate and prosecute criminals. Likewise, criminals often
employ new instruments to commit crimes and to evade police detection or
capture. Ordinary citizens, however, may employ many of these same instruments
to accommodate their everyday conveniences and necessities. According to
Professor Orin Kerr, this complex dynamic has contributed to the numerous
exceptions and seemingly divergent holdings of Fourth Amendment precedent.”).
116. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
117. Id. at 222.
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unreasonable search.
The dissent challenged the majority’s
reliance on the absence of physical trespass because the manner of
surveillance is not a relevant component of an analysis under
119
Katz.
120
The holding in Ciraolo was then applied in Florida v. Riley. In
Riley, the Supreme Court confronted a fact pattern very similar to
121
that of Ciraolo. The distinguishing factor in Riley was the much
lower altitude of 400 feet at which the police flew over the suspect’s
122
property. The Court again pointed to the fact that public usage
of the airspace approximately 500 feet above the ground is allowed
123
under the FAA guidelines and is a common occurrence. Mr. Riley
had a greenhouse in his backyard with two of its rooftop panels
missing, thus exposing the contents of the greenhouse to any
124
member of the public who might be flying above it. Since Mr.
Riley had exposed this information to the public, he could not have
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his
125
greenhouse.
Justice Brennan provided another dissent showing a significant
126
amount of concern for possible privacy violations in the future.
Justice Brennan’s disagreement with the majority can be summed
up succinctly in his own words, “I cannot agree that one ‘knowingly
exposes [an area] to the public’ solely because a helicopter may
127
legally fly above it.” The dissent pointed out that the majority’s
holding would seem to allow any police invasion of privacy as long
as a “single member of the public could conceivably position
herself to see into the area in question without doing anything
118. Id.
119. Id. at 223 (“Reliance on the manner of surveillance is directly contrary to
the standard of Katz, which identifies a constitutionally protected privacy right by
focusing on the interests of the individual and of a free society.”).
120. 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).
121. Compare Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (involving police surveillance in a fixed
wing aircraft of a suspect’s curtilage), with Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)
(involving police surveillance in a helicopter of a suspect’s curtilage).
122. Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
123. Id. at 450.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 450–51.
126. See id. at 456–67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I find considerable cause for
concern in the fact that a plurality of four justices would remove virtually all
constitutional barriers to police surveillance from the vantage point of
helicopters.”).
127. Id. at 457.
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128

illegal.” Thus, the majority’s analysis moved away from the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test and into a test of whether it
129
was possible for the public to see the illegal behavior in question.
The holding in Riley is crucial for analyzing drone cases
because the judgement of the Court seems to suggest if a police
aerial vehicle—such as a drone—is in an area in which the public
could conceivably and legally be, then it is not a search, no matter
130
what the aerial vehicle happens to see. The recently released FAA
guidelines for unmanned aerial systems sets the acceptable drone
131
elevation at up to 500 feet. The Court’s expansive view on aerial
surveillance has been dialed back slightly with subsequent case law;
however, based on this holding, it would appear that the
Constitution would allow for police drones, flying 500 feet above
the ground, to observe and record anything and everything below
without being considered a search. Justice Brennan provided a
strikingly appropriate hypothetical of a futuristic version of a
helicopter that can hover just above an enclosed courtyard or a
patio: “Suppose the police employed this miraculous tool to
discover not only what crops people were growing in their
greenhouses, but also what books they were reading and who their
132
dinner guests were.” Justice Brennan predicted the fears society
has today regarding drone use; however, under the majority’s
understanding of privacy and search law, such use of a drone would
not be considered a search and would therefore not require a
133
warrant.
Kyllo and Riley both considered how common the vehicle with
134
which the police conducted their surveillance was in everyday life.
In this day and age, drones are not as commonplace as planes or
128. Id.
129. Id. at 460.
130. Sheehan, supra note 49, at 280 (“This is especially problematic because
the current COAs allow public UAVs to fly under this [500 foot] limit while still
complying with the regulations in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act.”).
131. Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., DOT and FAA Propose New Rules
for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Feb. 15, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news
/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=18295; see Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Feb. 15, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news
/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=18297 (describing the FAA’s incremental
approach to safe UAS integration into the nation’s airspace).
132. Riley, 488 U.S. at 462 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 450 (majority opinion).
134. Id. at 458; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
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helicopters, which means that their use for surveillance purposes
could be more likely to constitute a search based on society’s
135
objective reasonable expectation of privacy from drones. Some
scholars predict that this could change over time: “[I]f the
appearance of drones hovering in the sky becomes commonplace
rather than novelty, and subsequently society becomes desensitized
to seeing drones floating over the backyard or the football field,
then a search by drone might cease to interfere with the reasonable
136
expectation of privacy.”
The Court has only slightly scaled back its view on aerial
surveillance. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the EPA hired a
professional photographer to fly above the business complex of
Dow Chemical Company and take pictures of the 2000 acres of
137
land. The Court maintained its prior reasoning and ruled that
138
this was not a search. However, it expressly stated that if the
photographer had been using some type of advanced technology
that could “pierce” the walls of the complex and either see or hear
139
into the buildings, there would likely be a search. Justice Powell
was greatly concerned by the Court’s decision to base whether a
140
search had occurred upon the manner of technology used. As
Justice Brennan opined, “Such an inquiry will not protect Fourth
Amendment rights, but rather will permit their gradual decay as
141
technology advances.” This explanation focuses on the fact that
as technology advances, the law will simply fall behind. The holding
in Dow Chemical likely limits the extent to which drones can use
features such as enhanced microphones, thermal imaging, and
other tools that would “pierce” the walls of a private home or
142
business.
Applying Supreme Court case law up to this point in time
suggests that police will arguably have very few limitations on drone
use. Police cannot use drones in a way that physically trespasses on

135. Stern & Rubekeil, supra note 29, at 8.
136. Id.
137. 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
138. Id. at 239.
139. Id. at 238.
140. Id. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
141. Id.
142. See Taly Matiteyahu, Drone Regulations and Fourth Amendment Rights: The
Interaction of State Drone Statutes and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 48 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265, 296 (2015).
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143

one’s home. Police cannot use advanced technology that would
144
allow them to see or hear anything inside of one’s home.
However, case law shows that police can conduct aerial surveillance
145
if they are at an altitude approved by the FAA. Moreover, it is not
clear how long a drone can continuously survey an individual
before requiring a warrant. One could argue that it would be
constitutional for the police, without a warrant, to use a drone to
survey an individual anytime he or she entered a public
146
thoroughfare or to investigate the curtilage of a suspect’s home.
This patchwork assortment of law is particularly concerning in the
drone context because drones can simply be manufactured or
adjusted in ways that make them more invasive, but still within the
minimal boundaries set forth by the Supreme Court’s Fourth
147
Amendment jurisprudence.
IV. THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION AND DRONE LEGISLATION
The U.S. Constitution does not limit the protection provided
148
by state constitutions to the citizens of that state. This system of
judicial federalism mandates only that the state constitution
149
provide at least what the U.S. Constitution requires. Minnesota is
143. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012).
144. See Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 237–38.
145. Sheehan, supra note 49, at 281 (“Due to the overwhelming amount of
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Katz test and the lack of information
provided by the FAA, any case involving UAV warrantless surveillance which
complies with the established FAA regulations would most likely be upheld by the
Supreme Court.”).
146. Andrea Lance, Back to the Future of Your Privacy Rights: U.S. v. Jones, 95
MASS. L. REV. 214, 216 (2013) (mentioning the lack of authority regarding longterm surveillance).
147. Koerner, supra note 1, at 1154 (“The government can navigate the
various doctrinal loopholes by altering the designs and capabilities of drones, the
location and flight paths of drones, the means of acquiring information, and the
types of information acquired. In effect, drones implicate the most factually
diverse aspects of an already diverse and unpredictable jurisprudence.”).
148. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); see also Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80–81 (1980). But see Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (“Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights
guarantee is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice,’ . . . the same
constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.”
(quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968))).
149. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
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among the majority of states that generally adheres to the principle
150
In adherence with this general principle,
of uniformity.
Minnesota has yet to adopt a stance on aerial surveillance that
151
provides more protection than that of the U.S. Constitution.
Since Minnesota courts remain in uniformity with the U.S.
Constitution in terms of privacy rights and aerial surveillance, the
same questions involving police drone use remain unanswered. As
Justice Alito pointed out in Jones, when the courts remain silent on
152
an issue, it can be useful to turn to the legislature. Unfortunately,
the Minnesota legislature also remains silent on the issue. In 2013
and early 2014, two Minnesota Senate bills and one Minnesota
153
House bill were introduced and sent to committee. These bills
died in committee due to an inability to garner the support needed
154
to become law.
These three bills represent two different theories of drone
155
156
legislation. Both HF 1994 and SF 2037 proposed a blanket
warrant requirement over all drone use, with a few exceptions: if
the drone is used to counter a high risk of a terrorist attack, if
police receive a warrant to use the drone, if the drone would be
used to prevent imminent danger to life or to catch a fleeing
suspect, and if the drone was needed to prevent the loss of life or
157
property in natural or manmade disasters.

150. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. Energy
& Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Printy, 351 N.W.2d 319, 351–52 (Minn. 1984) (holding that
Minnesota seeks uniformity between state and federal policies to reduce
unnecessary confusion).
151. See State v. Anderson, 414 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (“The
fly-over inspections (and aerial photography), if conducted in the public airspace,
were also not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.” (citing California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986))); see also State v. Nolan, 356 N.W.2d 670, 670–71
(Minn. 1984) (holding a search warrant was not required for the sheriff to search
defendant’s property because the Fourth Amendment does not protect open
fields).
152. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
153. See H.R. Res. 612, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013); S. Res. 485, 88th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2013).
154. See Dan Gunderson, Drone Bills Appear Grounded This Year in Minnesota
Legislature, MPR NEWS (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/04
/01/politics/drone-legislation-minnesota.
155. Minn. H.R. Res. 612.
156. Minn. S. Res. 485.
157. See id.; Minn. H.R. Res. 612.
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The other Minnesota bill, SF 2687, is different in that it laid
out a very specific and detailed system for law enforcement’s use of
158
drones. It also proposed a prohibition on the police drone use
without a warrant, making an exception for emergencies that
159
involve an imminent threat to persons or property. However, the
bill also required police drone use to comply with all FAA
guidelines, have a clearly and narrowly defined target, not use
facial recognition or other biometric technology without a court
order, not be equipped with weapons, only retain limited data, and
be accompanied by after-the-fact notice to the targets of drone
160
surveillance.
The bill goes even further, requiring all law
enforcement agencies to occasionally report drone use statistics to
161
the legislature and on their public websites. Additionally, the bill
proposed any judge approving or denying drone surveillance
warrants must report those statistics annually to the State Court
162
Administrator.
As mentioned above, none of these three bills made it through
committee, and therefore the legislature did not vote on these bills.
This likely reflects the fact that domestic drone technology was a
very new and emerging technology in 2013. At the time that these
bills were in committee, the FAA was developing new rules for the
163
use of drones in American airspace. Legislators arguably did not
want to set any hard and fast rules until they knew what kind of
164
boundaries the FAA was going to set. Other legislators, such as
Representative John Lesch, felt that this was a missed opportunity
165
for “foot-in-the-door legislation.” Representative Lesch expressed
his concern that this delay in legislation would allow companies
that manufacture and distribute drones to lobby against privacy
rights: “And then there is the inevitability that when another year
passes more and more agencies will decide, ‘Hey, I want to use
these drones,’ and then any privacy legislation gets bogged down in
166
a myriad of interested parties . . . .” These interested parties are

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See Minn. S. Res. 485.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Gunderson, supra note 154.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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certainly active and lobbying to protect their interests; however,
this issue is inherently going to bring privacy rights enthusiasts and
law enforcement agencies into direct competition.
V. EXISTING DRONE LEGISLATION
A.

Other State Legislation

Minnesota is not the only state that has thus far failed to
provide guidelines on the use of drones by law enforcement. In
2013 alone, “forty-three states introduced 130 drone-related
168
legislative proposals.”
Despite the high number of states
introducing proposals, by April 2014, less than one-third of all
states passed legislation restricting and/or regulating domestic
169
drone use. Those states that passed drone-use legislation are
prime examples of the variations of drone regulation.
Florida’s Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act,
originally passed in 2013, represents the more “standard” type of
170
current anti-drone legislation. The Act provides a blanket warrant
requirement for any police use of drones, but also lays out a few
171
specific exceptions to the general rule. The exceptions include
situations involving a high risk of terrorist attack and situations
when police have reasonable suspicion that drones are needed to

167. See, e.g., Sheehan, supra note 49, at 276 (“While much pressure on the
FAA was exerted by lobbying groups such as the Association for Unmanned
Vehicle Systems International, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
attempted to counter this pressure by filing a request under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) in 2009 for disclosures and further information on the
use of UAVs both in foreign nations and domestically.”).
168. Yang, supra note 79, at 367 (citing 2013 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org
/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/unmanned-aerial-vehicles.aspx).
169. Id.
170. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.
and Spec. A Sess. of the Twenty-Fourth Leg.); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.335
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (imposing a blanket warrant requirement
for the use of drones, but also including various exceptions to the general rule).
171. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50 (Westlaw); see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
167/15 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-495 of 2015 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. §§ 29-29.4-01 to -06 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-609 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.); TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 423.002 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
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prevent imminent loss of life or property, escape of suspects, or
172
destruction of evidence.
A style of legislation distinct from the blanket warrant
requirement in Florida is Idaho’s restriction on the use of
173
unmanned aircraft systems.
That statute categorizes law
enforcement’s use of drones based on whether the drones target
174
private property or public property.
Police drones targeting
175
public property are subject to virtually no legislative restrictions.
Law enforcement agencies’ only restraint on public property
targets is that they cannot photograph or record an individual,
without his or her consent, for the purpose of publically
176
disseminating that information.
When police drones target
private property, they can only be used without a warrant if the
private owner consents or if the use is an “emergency response for
177
safety, search and rescue or controlled substance investigations.”
This categorization of targeting private versus public property
reflects the constitutional case law that has developed to limit
privacy rights in public areas.
Other states use more amorphous statutory language
indicating that their legislatures intend to follow the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. For example,
Wisconsin’s Act 213 states that warrantless drone surveillance
cannot be used in a criminal investigation “to gather evidence or
other information from or at a place or location where an
178
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” The Act also
expressly states that its privacy protection does not extend to public
179
places. Similarly, Montana’s drone regulation statute excludes
the use of any evidence gathered by a drone unless the police
obtained a warrant for the drone or a judicially recognized
180
exception to the warrant requirement was present. This kind of
172. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50, subdiv. 4 (Westlaw).
173. Compare id. § 934.50 (Westlaw), with IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.).
174. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 21-213 (Westlaw).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.55, subdiv. 2 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act
127).
179. Id.
180. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-109, subdiv. 1 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Sess.).
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statutory language allows restrictions on police drone use to shift
and adapt alongside the Supreme Court’s developing case law.
Some states provide bright-line rules meant to combat specific
concerns about drone technology. For example, Oregon’s drone
restriction statute states that any time drone surveillance is
conducted, with or without a warrant, the period of continuous
181
surveillance cannot exceed thirty days. Tennessee’s Freedom
from Unwarranted Surveillance Act specifically states that “[t]he
use of a drone to gather evidence or information shall constitute a
182
search.”
In 2013, Virginia went to the extreme length of imposing a
two-year moratorium on all police drone use except in cases of
Amber Alerts, Senior Alerts, Blue Alerts, search and rescue
183
missions, and “training exercises related to such uses.” That
moratorium expired on July 1, 2015, and was immediately replaced
by a statute requiring a warrant for any police drone use other than
184
the exceptions mentioned in the moratorium.
VI. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION
Current application of constitutional law to police use of
drones provides more questions than answers. The gaps in privacy
protection need to be quickly filled by appropriate legislation and
not gradually covered up by the reactive application of judicial
185
interpretation.
The key question thus becomes: what is
appropriate legislation? Appropriate legislation provides for the
vital balance between individual privacy rights and public safety.
The law does not need to ban drone use because society fears the
capabilities of drones. However, legislation must be narrowly

181. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.320 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
But see Yang, supra note 79, at 379 (explaining the loophole in time limits that
could allow police to use a drone for the length of the limit, land the drone at
police headquarters for a minimal period of time, and then resume surveillance).
182. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609, subdiv. g(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015
1st Reg. Sess.).
183. H.R. 2012, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013).
184. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and
2016 Reg. Sess. c. 1).
185. Cf., e.g., O’Brien, supra note 45, at 222 (“Legislation that clearly defines
whether or not a warrant is needed for a drone search of a vehicle aids law
enforcement and puts the public on notice of its rights.”).
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tailored to ensure that drones cannot be used in the ways that we
fear.
Polls taken over the last several years make it clear that U.S.
citizens are, at the very least, wary about domestic use of drones by
186
police agencies. A 2012 poll found that only thirty percent of
187
voters favored the use of drones for domestic surveillance.
Another report, released in 2013, found that “[Forty-nine percent]
of Americans would be very concerned and [twenty percent] would
be somewhat concerned about their own privacy if U.S. law
enforcement started using unmanned drones with high tech
188
surveillance cameras and recording equipment.”
Public concern alone is not enough to justify an outright ban
189
on a promising new tool for police. Many states have responded
to public concern by drafting and enacting legislation that
effectively bans the use of drones for surveillance without a warrant
190
or absent a high-risk situation. These statutes provide exceptions
191
for various scenarios that are likely to occur very rarely. Statutes

186. Matiteyahu, supra note 142, at 282 (citing Voters Are Gung-Ho for Use of
Drones But Not over the United States, RASMUSSEN REP. (Feb. 13, 2012), http://
www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/afghanistan
/voters_are_gung_ho_for_use_of_drones_but_not_over_the_united_states).
187. Id.
188. MONMOUTH UNIV. POLL, NATIONAL: U.S. SUPPORTS UNARMED DOMESTIC
DRONES BUT PUBLIC PREFERS REQUIRING COURT ORDERS FIRST 2 (Aug. 15, 2013),
https://www.monmouth.edu/assets/0/32212254770/32212254991/32212254992
/32212254994/32212254995/40802189893/5f0b18a68abf431a8d84bf6d8138c3b2
.pdf.
189. See Yang, supra note 79, at 374 (“Society should not simply hamstring
drone use because of its ‘fear that rapidly advancing science and technology is
making [surveillance] more and more effective.’ Rather, there should [be a]
balance []between legitimate government needs and society’s privacy interest.”
(quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 71 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting))).
190. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.50(4) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st
Reg. Sess. and Spec. A Sess.); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.335 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (limiting law enforcement use of drones to search and
rescue activities, emergencies affecting individuals, and a declared state of
emergency).
191. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015
1st Reg. Sess.) (allowing the unwarranted use of drones “[t]o counter a high risk
of a terrorist attack”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1(C)(i) (West, Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess. and 2016 Reg. Sess. c. 1) (allowing the unwarranted use of drones
for Amber Alerts).
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drafted in such a way provide unnecessarily extreme restrictions on
192
police agencies.
On the other hand, not restricting law enforcement’s use of
drones whatsoever could be viewed as a failure of the legislature’s
obligation to represent the citizens who elected them. Therefore,
some sort of legislation is arguably necessary.
Some technology, by its very nature, revolutionizes police
193
practices. There are scholars who believe that when this happens,
the law adapts to the new technology by restoring police power to
194
what it was before the technological advancement. In doing so,
the balance between privacy rights and public safety is
195
maintained. Of course, it would be advantageous for the law to
preemptively adapt to the new technology before that technology is
196
used to the detriment of society.
Legislation needs to preemptively and specifically attack the
uses of drones that clearly violate the public’s sense of privacy (not
necessarily under the Katz analysis) but that are not clearly
192. See Yang, supra note 79, at 388 (“[T]he Court simply has not addressed
the limits of drone use as of yet, and the legislatures have misapplied warrant
requirements to drones when such requirements are too broad, too blunt, and
unreasonably restrictive.”).
193. Cf. Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches
to Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2014) (“Professor Paul
Ohm observes that, given how rapidly technology is changing our everyday lives
and our notions about what is considered ‘private,’ a more appropriate way to
understand the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is as a restraint on police
power.” (citing Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81
MISS. L.J. 1309, 1336–38 (2012))).
194. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 485 (2011) (“The law intentionally limits the scope of
police power to limit the government’s capacity for abusive practices. It allows
particularly invasive government practices only in limited circumstances when
investigators have specific reasons to link the person or place to the crime in a way
that justifies the intrusion.”).
195. See id. at 487–88 (“Equilibrium-adjustment acts as a correction
mechanism. . . . [W]hen judges perceive that changing technology or social
practice significantly enhances government power, courts embrace higher
protections to counter the expansion of government power.”).
196. See Richard W. Tast, Comment, Unmanned Aerial Systems: Domestic Statutory
Issues, 93 NEB. L. REV. 773, 802 (2015) (“Domestic use of [unmanned aerial
systems] has many potential benefits, so it is important for the laws regarding their
use to address negative ramifications in advance of implementation. Addressing
these issues in advance will ensure their public acceptance, allowing the positive
benefits to be fully realized.”).
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197

unconstitutional. Some categories of uses include: (1) duration
of drone surveillance; (2) drone proximity; (3) sense-enhancing
technology; (4) data retention; (5) dragnet versus targeted
198
surveillance; and (6) weaponization.
A.

Duration of Drone Surveillance

Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion in Jones, introduced the
idea that the duration of surveillance may have an effect on the
199
constitutionality of a search. This question was not resolved, but
the public would arguably be uncomfortable with the idea of
200
constant surveillance spanning an unlimited amount of time.
Long-term surveillance is dangerous because it “reveals patterns,
habits, and preferences of an individual’s life in a way that other
201
forms of surveillance do not.” A traditional police stakeout could
gather similar information, but drones can do so for significantly
202
less in operational costs.
Therefore, legislation should limit the maximum duration of
warrantless drone surveillance to something similar to twenty-four
203
hours in a seventy-two-hour window. It is important to draft the
legislation with a window of time that closes the loophole situation
where the police may use a drone for twenty-three hours,
momentarily land the drone back at headquarters, and then send it
204
back to resume surveillance.

197. Cf. Yang, supra note 79, at 388 (“[C]ourts and legislatures should look to
bright-line rules that are more precise, attuned, and reasonable, while affording a
similar level of protection that an ordinary person enjoys today.”).
198. See id. at 375–76.
199. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 961 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(“If the police attach a GPS device to a car and use the device to follow the car for
even a brief time, under the [majority’s] theory, the Fourth Amendment applies.
But if the police follow the same car for a much longer period using unmarked
cars and aerial assistance, this tracking is not subject to any Fourth Amendment
constraints.”).
200. See Farber, supra note 193, at 40 (“The concern regards the duration of
the monitoring—the greater the duration, the more intrusive the invasion and the
greater the amount of information the government can gather.”).
201. Victoria T. San Pedro, Student Work, Drone Legislation: Keeping an Eye on
Law Enforcement’s Latest Surveillance Technology, 43 STETSON L. REV. 679, 715 (2014).
202. See id at 714–15.
203. Yang, supra note 79, at 379.
204. Id.
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Drone Proximity

Another “fuzzy” area of constitutional surveillance law deals
with the places that drones can conduct surveillance. Using
legislation to limit drone proximity to homes and possibly the
curtilage would allow a clear consensus that the police cannot fly a
drone in your backyard. However, the legislation must strike a
balance between the inherent privacy interest in one’s backyard
205
and the need of law enforcement to protect the public safety.
Laws such as those enacted by Idaho—which effectively ban any
warrantless use of drones over private property—are far too
206
broad.
Private areas, for purposes of Idaho’s law, include
farmland and open fields, making it virtually impossible for police
207
to fly drones at all.
Appropriate legislation would consider the “reasonable
expectation of privacy test,” the Jones trespass analysis, and the FAA
208
guidelines for drones. This type of legislation would outlaw the
use of drones unreasonably close to private property, in violation of
the applicable FAA guidelines, or in a way that presents a nuisance
209
to the private property. This would clarify and reinforce the
constitutional case law that has developed to this point. It would
also balance the right of privacy and the need for public safety by
allowing police to conduct demonstrably necessary surveillance
210
without violating the Constitution.
C.

Sense-Enhancing Technology

One of the areas that presents the most potential for abuse is
the use of sense-enhancing technology in drones. Drones are
capable of using thermal imaging technology, license plate reading
211
Under Kyllo, it is
technology, and many other functions.
205. See id. at 379–80.
206. See id. at 380.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 381–82.
209. See id.
210. See O’Brien, supra note 45, at 223 (“[B]roadly prohibiting all warrantless
use of governmental drones is unnecessary and fails to adequately balance the
needs of privacy protection and law enforcement.”).
211. See id. at 217 (“A drone is augmenting the senses by providing long-term
surveillance with video, detailed images, and tracking technology that exceeds
human capabilities.” (citing Government Applications, DRAGANFLY INNOVATIONS, INC.,
http://www.draganfly.com/uav-helicopter/draganflyer-x4/applications
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considered a search for police to use sense-enhancing technology
that is not available to the public in order to view the interior of a
212
person’s home. However, due to the nature of drones and the
ever-increasing prevalence of sense-enhancing technology to the
public, the Kyllo holding is not enough to protect privacy rights
213
from drones.
Any drone legislation should prohibit the
warrantless use of any sense-enhancing technology used to view the
inside of a constitutionally protected area whether or not that
214
technology is available to the public. This would preemptively
answer the question of how the law will react if drones equipped
with thermal imaging cameras or other technology become
available to the general public.

/government.php (last visited Nov. 11, 2015))); Justin Lee, Public Drones Equipped
with Facial Recognition Software Raise Privacy Concerns, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (May 7,
2015),
http://www.biometricupdate.com/201505/public-drones-equipped-with
-facial-recognition-software-raise-privacy-concerns.
212. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“We think that obtaining
by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area . . . constitutes a search—at least where (as
here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.” (citation omitted)).
213. See Chris Schlag, The New Privacy Battle: How the Expanding Use of Drones
Continues to Erode Our Concept of Privacy and Privacy Rights, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L.
POL’Y 1, 16 (2013) (“As these technologies are not necessarily in general public
use, law enforcement’s use of them would likely trigger Fourth Amendment
protections under Kyllo. However, because the general public can actually
purchase the technology relatively easily, drone technology may be considered
more pervasive then originally believed.”); see also XIRO Xplorer Aerial UAV Drone
http://www.amazon.com/XIRO-Xplorer-Aerial
Quadcopter,
AMAZON.COM,
-Quadcopter-Version/dp/B01233S0TO/ref=sr_1_5?s=toys-and-games&ie=UTF8
&qid=1447256983&sr=1-5&keywords=drone&refinements=p_36%3A50000
-99999999 (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (illustrating the example of a remotecontrolled drone which can be purchased online by anyone for $639.00. The
drone shoots full HD video at 1080p/30fps and 720p/30fps, has several
photography modes, and has built in functions allowing the drone to
autonomously follow or circle around the pilot).
214. See Yang, supra note 79, at 384 (“As it pertains to private property, [this
Rule] restricts the government to ‘see[ing] what may be seen from a public
vantage point where [they have] a right to be.’” (quoting Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445, 449 (1989))).
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Data Retention

An important question involving the use of drones is: what
happens to the data that is collected by drones after they complete
their surveillance? Any aerial surveillance is likely to capture a
variety of individuals participating in legal and possibly illegal
behavior. What happens if a lawfully utilized drone is conducting
surveillance on a target of investigation and inadvertently captures
the day-to-day life of a neighbor of the target? Does the
government get to keep that data and store it away in case they
need information on the neighbor in the future? Drone legislation
in this area should mirror the Illinois statute that imposes a thirtyday retention limit on any information collected by a drone, unless
215
it is needed for criminal prosecution. Any violation of this rule
216
should result in the exclusion of that evidence.
E.

Dragnet Versus Targeted Surveillance

Dragnet surveillance is an issue that absolutely must be
addressed in drone legislation because the National Security
Agency has recently taken part in warrantless, dragnet
217
“Massive,
surveillance/collection of private phone data.
unabridged and unfiltered information gathering presents a
218
significant threat to privacy.” State legislation should be used to
expressly prohibit the practice of massive surveillance and dragnet
data collection. All drone use, including drone use without a
219
warrant, must be limited to a specific and identifiable target.

215. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 167/20 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-495 of
the 2015 Reg. Sess.); see also Allie Bohm, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of State
Legislation Passed This Year, ACLU (Nov. 7, 2013, 8:50 AM), https://www.aclu.org
/blog/year-drone-analysis-state-legislation-passed-year.
216. See Yang, supra note 79, at 387.
217. See Jonathan Weisman, Momentum Builds Against N.S.A. Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES (July 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/us/politics
/momentum-builds-against-nsa-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all (describing the
NSA’s telephone data collection program and the massive public outcry against
it).
218. Yang, supra note 79, at 386.
219. See San Pedro, supra note 201, at 719 (citing Zachary Fagenson, Florida
Keys Considering Drones to Help Eradicate Mosquitoes, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 17, 2013),
http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article1954207.html),
(“With
the
ubiquity of drone licenses among American law enforcement agencies, the dragnet surveillance that was once a laughable concept is now a reality.”).
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Drafting legislation in such a way prohibits the use of the Gorgon
Stare or other wide-angle drone camera technology that could
effectively surveil an entire city.
F.

Weaponization

Domestic drone weaponization is another hot-button issue that
220
needs to be addressed with legislation. Most Americans are
familiar with the use of drones in foreign wars and understand the
power that these tools possess. Obviously, any legislation should
disallow the use of predator-style drones equipped with missiles to
221
roam the national airspace, surveil, or target U.S. citizens.
However, drones are capable of more discrete weaponization. For
example, in Lucknow, India the local police purchased four drones
and equipped them with pepper spray, which the drones will use
222
for crowd control on angry or unruly crowds. Closer to home,
North Dakota has enacted legislation that allows drones to be
223
equipped with non-lethal weapons.
Domestic drone weaponization is unnecessary and presents a
litany of dangers, which would be best to avoid. Legislation passed
224
225
226
227
by Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin all expressly
prohibit any type of weaponization of domestic drones. Domestic
drones should be left to the use of surveillance. Therefore, any
legislation should expressly prohibit equipping drones with lethal
228
or non-lethal weapons.

220. See Brinkerhoff, supra note 43.
221. See MQ-1B Predator Drone Fact Sheet, U.S.A.F. (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq
-1b-predator.aspx (describing the technical aspects of the MQ-1B Predator drone).
222. Monica Sarkar, Security From the Sky: Indian City to Use Pepper-Spray Drones
for Crowd Control, CNN (last updated Apr. 9, 2015, 8:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com
/2015/04/09/asia/india-police-drones.
223. See Brinkerhoff, supra note 43.
224. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.365 (West, Westlaw through 2015).
225. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63G-18-101 to 63G-18-105 (West, Westlaw through
2015) (restricting government use of data collected by drones).
226. 2013 Va. Acts 755 § 1 (prohibiting weaponization of domestic drones
before July 1, 2005).
227. S.B. 196, Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2013).
228. Eric Brumfield, Armed Drones for Law Enforcement: Why It Might Be Time to
Re-Examine the Current Use of Force Standard, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 543, 555 (2014)
(citing Chris Calabrese & Jay Stanley, Ban on Arming Domestic Drones: Let’s Draw a
Line in the Sand, ACLU (June 15, 2012, 7:44 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog
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VII. CONCLUSION
Whether society likes it or not, drone technology is expanding
at a rapid rate. Law enforcement agencies are noticing the
potential benefits that such technology could have in their
operations. However, this new technology does not translate well
into the current constitutional case law regarding tracking and
aerial surveillance. Therefore, there is a massive amount of room
for abuse. The potential for violations of American citizens’ privacy
rights is unsettling.
The Minnesota Constitution does not clear up the potential
issues raised under federal constitutional law, and Minnesota
legislation has yet to enact a law that would regulate drone
technology abuse. Other states have approached the issue in their
own ways. Reviewing these other state statutes and weighing their
strengths and weaknesses allows future legislation to build and
improve upon the initial laws.
Many of these initial state statutes lean towards the prohibition
of police drone use instead of drone regulation. These statutes only
allow drones to be used in certain exigent circumstances as defined
in their respective statutes. While doing so, the said statutes ignore
the benefits to society that drones can offer.
The FBI’s National Crime Information Center reports that
229
there were 635,155 missing person reports in 2014 alone. Drones
are particularly well suited to search areas for individuals and to
surveil designated locations. In cases where time is of the essence,
does society really want to bog down deployment of potentially lifesaving technology with specific, cumbersome warrant procedures
and protocols? Does society want to limit the use of drones only to
situations where probable cause exists even if similar, but less
effective, forms of surveillance could be conducted without a
230
warrant?
/technology-and-liberty-free-speech-nationalsecurity/ban-arming-domestic
-drones) (“The ACLU believes it will be easier for a LEA to use force against the
public, and therefore ‘force will be used more . . . [and armed d]rones may also be
more likely to result in harm to innocent bystanders.’”).
229. NCIC Missing Person and Unidentified Person Statistics for 2014, FBI, https://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic/ncic-missing-person-and-unidentified-person
-statistics-for-2014 (last visited Apr. 28, 2016).
230. See Yang, supra note 79, at 374 (“Here, the inexact application of a broad
restriction inevitably leads to an odd and unreasonable result: under a blanket
warrant requirement scheme drones would be unable to perform, without a
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The appropriate legislation for domestic law enforcement use
of drones is to enact bright-line rules restricting the use of drones
in ways that violate society’s general notions of privacy. These
bright-line rules should, at least, regulate: (1) the duration of
drone surveillance; (2) drone proximity; (3) sense-enhancing
technology; (4) data retention; (5) dragnet versus targeted
231
surveillance; and (6) weaponization.
Drone technology will continue to advance. The police will
continue to utilize this technology. Therefore, the privacy rights of
U.S. citizens are dependent upon the preemptive passage of
legislation that lays out a vision of how police drones will be used in
the future. Without such legislation, we will continue to stumble
blindly through the unknown. The suggestions made herein would
provide a guiding light for law enforcement agencies to follow so
that they may fulfill their legitimate duty to protect the public while
maintaining society’s fundamental values.

warrant, some of the same surveillance tasks from the same locations that
helicopters and airplanes have been authorized to execute without warrants for
decades.”).
231. See id. at 388 (“Instead of applying a near-universal warrant requirement,
courts and legislatures should look to bright-line rules that are more precise,
attuned, and reasonable, while affording a similar level of protection that an
ordinary person enjoys today.”).

